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1982 AMENDMENTS TO VIRGINIA'S DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of fatal automobile crashes involving alcohol-impaired
drivers has reached epidemic proportions in the United States. While the
exact number of alcohol-related crashes is not known, almost one-half of
all fatally injured drivers tested in the United States were found to have
been too intoxicated to drive.1 Although statistics show a lower percent-
age of alcohol-related fatal crashes in Virginia than the prevailing na-
tional average, 2 the pervasiveness of the problem and its dire conse-
quences 3 resulted in legislative action to change Virginia's laws governing
drinking and driving.
In 1982 the Virginia General Assembly amended several statutory sec-
tions4 pertaining to persons driving while intoxicated (DWI). In most in-
stances, the legislation instituted both harsher and mandatory measures
of punishment 5 although the harshness is alleviated somewhat by provi-
sion for a restricted drivers license.
6
This article sets forth a brief history of the drinking and driving prob-
lem in general, with special emphasis on the situation in Virginia. The
recent statutory changes to Virginia's DWI laws are summarized by com-
parison of the penalties and provisions of the old 7 and new8 statutes. This
1. This proposition is based on the high blood alcohol content (BAC) of those drivers
tested. Forty to fifty-five percent had BAC's exceeding 0.10%, which exceeds the limits al-
lowed under the laws of most states. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY,
A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 8, 65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL AND
HIGHWAY SAFETY]; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, A REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS FROM THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION (1968), cited in Comment, VASAP: A
Rehabilitation Alternative to Traditional DWI Penalties, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673
(1978).
2. Alcohol-related fatalities in Virginia were 30.7% in 1971, but decreased to 26.8% in
1972, and 29.0% in 1973. Between 1974 and 1980 such fatalities averaged approximately
33%. VA. ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM, VA. DEP'T OF TRANSP. SAFETY, VASAP FACT
SHEET 3-1 (April 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as VASAP FACT SHEET].
3. The unchanged percentiles between 1974 and 1980 translate to a loss of approximately
353 lives per year due to alcohol-impaired drivers. Compiled from VASAP FACT SHEET,
supra note 2, at 3-1.
4. Act of April 8, 1982, ch. 301, 1982 Va. Acts (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-36, 18.2-
270 to -271.1, 46.1-417 (Repl. Vol. 1982) (effective date of July 1, 1982)). Virginia Acts con-
tains both previous and current statutory language.
5. See 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(bla) (Repl. Vol. 1982). See infra notes 60-61 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-36, -270 to -271.1, 46.1-417 (Repl. Vol. 1982) were amended by
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article also analyzes whether the new statutory changes are actually more
stringent. This analysis draws on the results of studies from other locali-
ties which have enacted "stricter" DWI laws.9 The conclusion offers a
forecast of whether the new laws will result in harsher punishment and
considers possible future developments in Virginia's DWI laws.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DRINIUNG DRIVERS
A. In General
By 1903, ten years after the introduction of the automobile in the
United States, DWI already had become a problem;10 and by 1940, alco-
hol was perceived as a major problem in traffic safety." Public pressure
mounted on the federal government to make highways safer, and Con-
gress responded by passing two highway safety acts.12 Pursuant to one of
those acts, the Department of Transportation in 1968 published the re-
sults of a comprehensive study of the relationship between alcohol and
highway safety.13 Two specific findings emerged from this study: "Alcohol
is involved in 50% of traffic fatalities," and "alcoholics and problem
drinkers, who constitute but a small minority of the general population,
account for a very large part of the overall highway safety problem.1
14
These two findings shaped the general policies of the federal government
in the late 1960's and 1970's.15 The result was the creation of Alcohol
Safety Action Projects (ASAP's), which initiated programs designed to
reduce drinking and driving on the nation's highways.1
the 1982 DWI legislation.
9. The effectiveness of stricter DWI laws in reducing the number of alcohol-impaired
drivers is beyond the scope of this article. An analysis of the efficacy of legislation is a
separate subject from an analysis of its stringency.
10. Cameron, The Impact of Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Review and Evalua-
tion, 8 CoNrrEMP. DRUG PROBS. 495 (1979). See Comment, supra note 1, at 674. See also
ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 3 (a broad generalization is made that alco-
hol and driving have long been recognized as a serious health problem).
11. Cameron, supra note 10, at 496.
12. Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1967) (codified at 23
U.S.C. §§ 105, 307, 307 note, 401-407 (Supp. 1982)); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1967) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1301
note, 1381-1431 (1982)).
13. Id. at 501-02.
14. U.S. DRP'T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, A REPORT OF THE CONGRESS
FROM THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORATION (1968), quoted in Cameron, supra note 10, at 502.
Fifty percent of the traffic fatalities in the United States for one year equals approximately
25,000 deaths. Comment, Criminal Law-Mandatory Jail Sentences: An Effective Solution
to the Drunk Driver Crisis?-Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.515 (1979), 55 WASH. L. Rxv. 677,
678 n.9 (1980).
15. Cameron, supra note 10, at 502.
16. Id. at 503. See VASAP FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 1-1, 2-1. The specific counter-
measures employed, and the success or failure of the ASAP's are beyond the scope of this
article. For a compehensive discussion of the ASAP programs in the United States, see
[Vol. 17:189
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED LAWS
States reacted to the federal findings by enacting blood alcohol content
(BAC) 1 and "implied consent" legislation. 8 All states define alcohol im-
pairment in terms of BAC.19 Some states, though, make a distinction as
to whether a specified maximum BAC is "presumptive" or "per se" evi-
dence of alcohol-impairment.2" The passage and enforcement of the state
legislation, though, was impeded by prevailing attitudes which did not
condone strict measures against the drunk driver. The drunk driver was
viewed not as a criminal but as someone who was "just careless, possibly
sick, perhaps even funny."'" However, in 1982, state legislative sessions
demonstrated a shift in this complacency. Over half of the state legisla-
tures are now reexamining their drunk-driving laws, while many have en-
acted tough new laws to crack down on drunk drivers.2
2
B. Virginia
Virginia has faced DWI problems similar to those faced by the nation
as a whole. The problem of drinking drivers was addressed by statute in
Cameron, supra note 10; ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1. For a comprehensive
study of the ASAP program in Virginia, see Comment, supra note 1.
17. Blood alcohol level is the measure of the weight of alcohol present in a given volume
of blood. For example, if a given measurement showed 0.01 grams of alcohol in a 100 millili-
ter sample of blood, the result would be interpreted as 0.10% blood alcohol concentration
(BAC). ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 5.
18. Under the principle of implied consent, when a person drives, the person impliedly
consents to submit to a chemical test if asked to do so after being arrested for DWI. A
refusal to submit results in a loss of license. Id. at 38.
19. In 48 states a BAC of 0.10% or higher constitutes impairment. In Idaho and Utah the
maximum level is only 0.08%. Id. at 37.
20. In the 23 states that have "per se" laws, driving with a BAC exceeding a given value is
deemed illegal. Gaynes, Putting the Brakes on Drunk Driving, STATE LEGISLATURES, July/
Aug., 1982, at 29; NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FACTS ON
ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY LAWS 3 (1982).
21. Gaynes, supra note 20, at 28.
22. The states of Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Maine, New Mexico and Utah are among
states including mandatory punishments in their statutes for conviction of DWI. Id. at 28.
Virginia's 1982 changes also include mandatory punishments. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270
(Repl. Vol. 1982). See infra note 42. Besides Virginia, states recently enacting major revi-
sions in their DWI laws are: Arizona, 1982 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Reg. Sess., ch. 234 (to be
codified at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28); California, CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23100, 23151, 23231
(West Cum. Supp. 1982); Colorado, 1982 Colo. Sess. Laws 82-408 (to be codified at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 42-4); Florida, 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 82-155 (West); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-237 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (amendments effective Jan. 1, 1983); Maine, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29, §§ 1312-1312D, 1314, 1863, 2184, 2241, 2241-I, 2292 to 2298-A, 2301, 2306
(1981); Maryland, MD. TRANSp. CODE ANN. §§ 16-205 to -303 (Cum. Supp. 1982); Minnesota,
1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 423 (West); Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.06-07,
4507.16, 4507.38, 4507.99, 4511.19, 4511.99, 4511.191 (Page 1981); South Dakota, S.D. CODI-
FlED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-23-1 to -4, -23-7, -23-10 to -11.1, -23-13 to -14.1, -24-3 to -7 (Interim
Supp. 1982); Tennessee, 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 891 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-
10-403 (Advance Leg. Serv. 1982)); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1982); Wyoming, Wyo.
STAT. § 31-5-233, -1117, -7-127 (Supp. 1982).
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1916.23 Since then, Virginia has adopted measures taken by other states,
such as implied consent,2 4 BAC testing,2 5 and "presumptive" evidence of
impairment."
Virginia currently has a Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Program
(VASAP) with a state office and twenty-five local programs.27 The 1975
General Assembly enacted legislation which coupled the VASAP rehabili-
tative approach with traditional punitive statutes. 2 Similarly the 1982
changes to Virginia's DWI laws interact with the Viginia Code section
authorizing VASAP treatment of persons charged with alcohol impair-
ment. 9 However, these changes, passed in part due to pressure applied
by citizen's lobby groups,30 resulted in stricter DWI laws. Virginia has
thus joined other states which are implementing mandatory punishment
for DWI.31
III. CHANGES IN VIRGINIA'S DWI LAWS
A. Involuntary Manslaughter
The revision of Virginia's DWI laws changed the punishment for invol-
untary manslaughter from a class six felony to a class five felony.3 2 This
23. H. 387, 1916 Va. Acts (codifed at VA. CODE § 4722 (1916)) provided, in part, that "it
shall be unlawful for any chauffeur, motorman, engineer, or other persons to drive or run
any automobile, car, truck, engine, or train while under the influence of intoxicants," quoted
in Comment, supra note 1, at 674 n.14.
The current statute reads, in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate
any motor vehicle, engine or train while under the influence of alcohol, or while under the
influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatso-
ever nature." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268(b) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
25. Id. § 18.2-269.
26. Id. § 18.2-2.269(3) which states in reference to BAC testing: "If there was at that time
0.10 percent of alcohol in the accused's blood, it shall be presumed that the accused was
under the influence of alcoholic intoxicants." Id. This presumption is evidence to be consid-
ered by the jury. However, the accused may present evidence to rebut this presumption.
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1958). Virginia is one of 27 states that have
not enacted "per se" laws. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27. VASAP FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 2-1, 2-2.
28. Comment, supra note 1, at 673.
29. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 1982) with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. Pressure was applied to Virginia's legislators by citizens' lobby groups. This pressure
resulted in swift passage of the new DWI laws. Interview with Julian Hickman, VASAP
Evaluator, Virginia Department of Transportation Safety, in Richmond, Virginia (August 3,
1982). The intensity of the lobbying effort is demonstrated by the fact that no legislative
studies were conducted prior to implementation of the new DWI laws. Generally studies are
conducted prior to major legislative revisions. As a result, little or no legislative history is
available. Telephone interview with Mary Devine, Virginia Legislative Services, in Rich-
mond (July 28, 1982).
31. See Gaynes, supra note 20, at 28-30.
32. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-36 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36 (Repl. Vol.
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marks a significant change, as the punishment range for a class six felony
is imprisonment for not less than one year, nor more than five years;33
whereas a class five felony is punishable by imprisonment for not less
than one year, nor more than ten years. 34 The maximum range of punish-
ment was thus increased by five years.
One definition of involuntary manslaughter is the killing of one acci-
dentally, without intent, while improperly performing a lawful act consti-
tuting criminal negligence. 35 The definition fits an intoxicated person who
accidentally kills another while driving an automobile. This act is an im-
proper act that may constitute criminal negligence.
In Virginia, one committing a homicide while violating the DWI sec-
tions of the Virginia Code" may be convicted of involuntary manslaugh-
ter.37 The evidence of a DWI conviction is admissible to show criminal
negligence, that is, to show negligence so gross and culpable as to indicate
a callous disregard for human life. The degree of intoxication is an impor-
tant circumstance relevant to making the determination of criminal negli-
gence, as opposed to a finding of simple negligence.38 A finding of simple
negligence is not sufficient to support a felony charge of involuntary
manslaughter.3 9
The increase in the maximum allowable punishment to which a drink-
ing driver may be subjected is viewed by proponents as a measure that
will deter drinking and driving.40 The desired goal is a concomitant re-
duction in traffic fatalities. The belief is that since alcohol impairment is
the number one cause of traffic fatalities, deterring drinkers from driving
1982)).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f) (Repl. Vol. 1982) reads:
(f) For Class 6 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor
more than five years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case
without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not
more than $1,000, either or both.
34. Id. § 18.2-10(e) states:
(e) For Class 5 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor
more than ten years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case
without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not
more than $1,000, either or both.
35. E.g., King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 231 S.E.2d 312 (1977).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 1982). See supra note 23.
37. Massie v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 883, 886, 15 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1941).
38. Beck v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 1, 5, 216 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1975).
39. King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 606, 231 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1977).
40. The general theme of citizens' groups who lobbied the 1982 General Assembly for
stricter DWI laws was that increased sanctions would deter drinking and driving. See Inter-
view with Julian Hickman, supra note 30. Some of the major citizens' lobby groups in Vir-
ginia are Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Many Against Drunk Driving (MADD),
and Concerned Citizens.
1982]
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will reduce the number of fatalities."'
B. Penalties for DWI
Many changes were made in the Virginia Code section that sets punish-
ments for DWI. These changes increased the maximum punishments and
fines permissible and established mandatory minimum jail sentences. 2
For first convictions, the previous statutory language defined DWI as a
class two misdemeanor, punishable by confinement for not more than six
months and a fine of not more than $500, either or both;43 the 1982
change defines DWI as a class one misdemeanor, punishable by confine-
ment for not more than twelve months and/or a fine of not more than
$1,000. 4 4 Previously, second and subsequent convictions within ten years
were punishable by confinement for not less than one month, nor more
than one year, and a fine of not less than $200, nor more than $1,000."I In
the 1982 changes second and third convictions are treated differently. A
second conviction within five years is punishable by confinement for not
41. Cf. ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 35-41 (comprehensive discussion
of the legal/deterrence approach).
42. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-270 (codified at VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-270 (Repl. VoL
1982)), which reads, in part:
Any person violating any provision of § 18.2-266 shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor.
Any person convicted of a second offense within less than five years after a first
offense under § 18.2-266 shall be punishable by a fine of not less than $200 nor more
than $1,000 and by confinement in jail for not less than one month nor more than one
year. Forty-eight hours of such confinement shall be a mandatory, minimum sentence
not subject to suspension by the court. Any person convicted of a second offense
within a period of five to ten years of a first offense under § 18.2-266 shall be punish-
able by a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $1,000 and by confinement in jail
for not less than one month nor more than one year. Any person convicted of a third
offense or subsequent offense within ten years of an offense under § 18.2-266 shall be
punishable by a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 and by confinement
in jail for not less than two months nor more than one year. Thirty days of such
confinement shall be a mandatory, minimum sentence not subject to suspension by
the court if the third or subsequent offense occurs within less than five years. Ten
days of such confinement shall be a mandatory, minimum sentence not subject to
suspension by the court if the third or subsequent offense occurs within a period of
five to ten years of a first offense.
Information used to compile a summary of changes in Virginia's DWI laws was compiled
from 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301 and Va. Highway Transp. Research Council, Statutory Sum-
mary of Changes to Virginia's DWI Laws (1982) (unpublished manuscript available from
Virginia Transportation Research Council, Charlottesville, Virginia) [hereinafter cited as
Statutory Summary].
43. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-270; Statutory Summary, supra note 42.
44. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-270; Statutory Summary, supra note 42. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-11(a) (Repl. Vol. 1982) (Punishment for a class one misdemeanor is confinement
in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $1,000, either or both.).
45. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-270; Statutory Summary, supra note 42.
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less than two months, nor more than one year, and a fine of not less than
$200 nor more than $1,000. Also, third and subsequent convictions within
ten years are punishable by confinement for not less than two months,
nor more than one year, and a fine of not less than $500, nor more than
$1,000.46
Mandatory minimum jail sentences were also introduced by the new
DWI legislation. 47 Prior to this legislation, there were no mandatory peri-
ods of confinement for either first or subsequent convictions.48 Currently,
a second conviction within five years is punished by mandatory confine-
ment for forty-eight hours. A third conviction within five years is pun-
ished by a mandatory confinement for thirty days. A third conviction
within a period of five to ten years after first conviction is punished by
mandatory confinement for ten days.'
C. Loss of Drivers License for DWI
In examining the statutory changes made by section 18.2-271 of the
Virginia Code, which governs license revocation and suspension, it is nec-
essary to note the following language, "[e]xcept as provided in § 18.2-
271.1, . . 50 The exceptions referred to are suspension of revocation of
46. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-270; Statutory Summary, supra note 42.
47. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-270.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1982) states:
Except as provided in § 18.2-271.1, the judgment of conviction if for a first offense
under § 18.2-266, or for a similar offense under any county, city or town ordinance,
shall of itself operate to deprive the person so convicted of the privilege to drive or
operate any motor vehicle, engine or train in the Commonwealth for a period of six
months from the date of such judgment. If such conviction is for a second or other
subsequent offense (i) within five years of a first offense conviction under § 18.2-266
such person's license to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train shall be suspended
for a period of three years or, (ii) within five to ten years of a first offense conviction
under § 18.2-266 such person's license to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train shall
be suspended for a period of two years from the date of the judgment of conviction.
Any such period of license suspension, in any case shall run consecutively with any
period of suspension for failure to permit a blood or breath sample to be taken as
required by § 18.2-268. If any person has heretofore been convicted or found not
innocent in the case of a juvenile of violating any similar act in the Commonwealth or
any other state and thereafter is convicted of violating the provisions of § 18.2-266,
such conviction or finding shall for the purpose of this section and § 18.2-270 be a
subsequent offense and shall be punished accordingly. Six months of any license sus-
pension or revocation imposed pursuant to this section for a first offense conviction
may be suspended, in whole or in part by the court upon the entry of such person
convicted into and the successful completion of a program pursuant to § 18.2-271.1.
Upon a second conviction, the court may not suspend more than two years of such
license suspension or revocation if such second conviction occurred less than five
years after a previous conviction under § 18.2-270, nor more than one year if such
second conviction occurred five to ten years after a previous conviction. Upon a third
1982]
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a drivers license, premised on VASAP attendance, and the issuance of a
restricted drivers license.51
A summary of the changes in drivers license revocation and suspension
follows. 52 For first convictions, the previous statute called for mandatory
revocation for a period of not less than six months, nor more than one
year, in the discretion of the judge.5" The 1982 change results in revoca-
tion of the license for six months; however, the entire six months may be
suspended by the court, conditioned upon the completion of the VASAP
program. 54 Previously, second convictions within ten years resulted in
mandatory license revocation for a period of three years. Currently a sec-
ond conviction within a period of five years results in license revocation
for three years. No more than two of the three years may be suspended
by the court. A second conviction within a period of five to ten years of a
previous conviction results in license revocation for two years. No more
than one year of the two years may be suspended by the court. Third
convictions result in permanent revocation under both the previous and
the current statutory sections.55
D. VASAP Referrals; The Restricted License; and Out-of-State DWI
Convictions
1. VASAP Referrals
VASAP entrance requirements are governed by section 18.2-271.1 of
the Virginia Code. 56 Under the previous statutory language a conviction
conviction of a violation of § 18.2-266, such person shall not be eligible for participa-
tion in a program pursuant to § 18.2-271.1.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(a), (bla), (Repl. Vol. 1982). See infra notes 56, 60.
52. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301; Statutory Summary, supra note 42. See supra note 42.
53. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-271 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271 (Repl VoL
1982)); Statutory Summary, supra note 42. In 1981, the usual disposition of a DWI first
conviction in Virginia was a VASAP referral. VASAP FAcTr SHEET, supra note 2, at 3-1. The
result was a conviction rate of less than 28% of those arrested for DWI. Id. at 3-1, table 3.2.
54. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-271; Statutory Summary, supra note 42.
55. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-271; Statutory Summary, supra note 42.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(a) (Repl. Vol. 1982). This subsection reads:
Any person convicted of a violation of § 18.2-266, or any ordinance of a county, city
or town similar to the provisions thereof, or any second offense thereunder, may, with
leave of court or upon court order, enter into an alcohol safety action program, or a
driver alcohol rehabilitation program or such other alcohol rehabilitation program as
may in the opinion of the court be best suited to the needs of such person, in the
judicial district in which such charge is brought or in any other judicial district upon
such terms and conditions as the court may set forth. In the determination of the
eligibility of such person to enter such a program, the court shall consider his prior
record of participation in any other alcohol rehabilitation program. If such person has
never entered into or been committed to a driver alcohol safety action program or
driver alcohol rehabilitation program or similar rehabilitation or education program,
in keeping with the procedures provided for in this section, and upon motion of the
accused or his counsel, the court shall give mature consideration to the needs of such
[Vol. 17:189
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of DWI was not required for referral to VASAP; referral was possible
either upon a plea of guilty or upon the court's hearing evidence sufficient
to establish guilt. Referral was not explicitly limited to first offenders,
and there was a fee of $200 for the program."
Currently, a conviction for DWI must be entered on the record before
the court can refer an offender to the VASAP program, and the fee for
the program has been increased to $250.11 Also, upon a third conviction a
person is ineligible for the VASAP program.
5 9
2. The Restricted License
There was no provision for the issuance of a restricted drivers license
prior to the 1982 legislation. Currently, a restricted license may be issued
to any person referred to a VASAP program.0 However, the license may
be issued only for a) travel to and from VASAP, b) travel to and from ihe
offender's place of employment, and c) travel during the offender's hours
of employment where operation of a motor vehicle is necessary.61
3. Out-of-State Convictions
Under the previous statute, an out-of-state conviction for DWI was
treated as a conviction for purposes of sentencing and license revocation.
However, a person convicted in another jurisdiction could petition the
court for referral to a VASAP program. Upon referral to a VASAP pro-
gram, the privilege to drive was restored, conditioned upon completion of
VASAP. If the VASAP program was completed, then the record of the
out-of-state conviction was expunged. 2
Currently, if the out-of-state conviction is a first conviction, the of-
person in determining whether he be allowed to enter such program.
57. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-271.1 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (Repl. Vol.
1982)); Statutory Summary, supra note 42. See supra note 42.
58. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-271.1; Statutory Summary, supra note 42. See supra
notes 42, 51.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1982). See supra note 50.
60. The applicable subsection states:
(bla) Whenever a person enters a program pursuant to this section, and such per-
son's license to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train in the Commonwealth has
been suspended or revoked, the court may, in its discretion and for good cause shown,
provide that such person be issued a restricted permit to operate a motor vehicle for
any or all of the following purposes: (i) travel to and from his place of employment; or
(ii) travel to an alcohol rehabilitation program entered pursuant to this paragraph; or
(iii) travel during the hours of such person's employment if the operation of a motor
vehicle is a necessary incident of such employment.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(bla) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
61. Id.
62. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, §§ 18.2-271.1(bl), 46.1-417. Statutory Summary, supra note 42.
See supra note 42.
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fender may petition the court for restoration of the privilege to drive. The
court has the discretion to restore the privilege to drive, conditioned upon
the completion of a VASAP program."3 If the conviction is a second con-
viction within ten years, the revocation provision of section 18.2-271 of
the Virginia Code64 becomes operative. Then, the court may not suspend
more than two years of the license revocation. Also, completion of a
VASAP program does not expunge the out-of-state conviction from Divi-
sion of Motor Vehicle records."
IV. ANALYSIS: ARE THE DWI LAWS MORE STRICT?
It is obvious that the new DWI laws increase the maximum allowable
punishments and fines in addition to providing for mandatory sentences
and license suspension.66 On their face the new laws appear more strict.
However, a further look into the operation of the legal system is neces-
sary to determine if these laws are indeed more stringent.
In determining if a new law is more strict than the previous law, a ma-
63. The applicable subsection reads:
(bl) Any person who has been convicted in another state of the violation of a law
of such state substantially similar to the provisions of § 18.2-266, and whose privilege
to operate a motor vehicle in this State is subject to revocation under the provisions
of § 46.1-417, may petition the general district court of the county or city in which he
resides that he be given probation and assigned to a program as provided in subsec-
tion (a) of this section and that upon successful completion of such program his privi-
lege to operate a motor vehicle in this State be restored or, if unrevoked, that any
order of the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles revoking such privilege
be stayed. If the court shall find that such person would have qualified therefor if he
had been convicted in this State of a violation of § 18.2-266, the court may grant the
petition and may suspend the period of license suspension or revocation imposed pur-
suant to § 46.1-417. Such suspension of sentence shall be conditioned upon the suc-
cessful completion of a program by the petitioner. If such person has previously been
convicted of a violation under § 18.2-266 or the laws of any other state substantially
similar thereto, the court may suspend not more than two years of the sentence of
license suspension or revocation imposed. If the court subsequently finds that such
person has violated any of the conditions set forth by the court, the court shall dis-
pose of the case as if no program had been entered and shall impose a sentence of
license suspension or revocation in accordance with the provisions of §§ 18.2-271 or
46.1-421 (a). A copy of the order granting the petition or subsequently revoking or
suspending such person's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be forthwith sent to
the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles.
No period of suspension or license revocation shall be imposed pursuant to this
subsection which, when considered together with any period of license suspension or
revocation previously imposed for the same offense in any state, results in such per-
son's license being suspended for a period in excess of the maximum periods specified
in this subsection.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(bl) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
64. Id. § 18.2-271.
65. Id. § 46.1-417 (Repl. Vol. 1982) (Expungement provisions were deleted by the 1982
DWI legislation.).
66. See supra notes 42, 50.
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jor consideration is whether the legal system will enforce the new sanc-
tions as written. If the legal system views the new sanctions as too severe,
it will find ways to avoid convicting persons for DWI.6 7 This means that
both the legislation and the resulting convictions for DWI must be ex-
amined to determine if they will, in fact, result in stiffer penalties.6 8 Since
Virginia's new DWI laws have become effective only recently,6 9 the find-




No studies were found that directly address the question of the drink-
ing driver convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The new law increases
the maximum allowable punishment, but whether the maximum will be
utilized is a matter of conjecture. Studies do indicate, however, that both
judges and juries are reluctant to inflict severe penalties for DWI when
such penalties result in hardship.7 1 Whether this attitude is carried over
to include the drinking driver accused of involuntary mansalughter is not
clear.7
2
A factor that may influence the imposition of stiffer penalties is a pub-
lic outcry against the offense of DWI. It was such an outcry by organized
groups that led to the passage of the new legislation.73 It is likely that
both judges and juries are sensitive to the mood of the public.74 There-
67. In studies conducted in other states, most courts regarded legislated penalties for
DWI as too harsh. They exercised judicial ingenuity to avoid imposing legislative sanctions.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., No. DOT-HS-804-033, REsuLTs OF NATIONAL ALCO-
HOL SAFETY ACTION PRojEcTs II 20 [hereinafter cited as NHTSA H]. See NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., No. DOT-HS-803-361, ExEcuTIVE SuMMARY OF FIVE ALCOHOL
SAFETY ACTION PRoJEcrS' JutwCIL SYsTrms 4-6 (June, 1978) [hereinafter cited as NHTSA
1978]; Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1660, 1667 (1981).
68. See NHTSA 1978, supra note 67 and NHTSA H, supra note 67. Cf. Gaynes, supra
note 20, at 29 (discussing the effect of severe penalties on convictions; conclusion based,
however, on a low arrest rate of drinking drivers).
69. The DWI laws were effective July 1, 1982. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301.
70. See NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 2-7; NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 20; ALCOHOL
AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 39.
71. See NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 20; ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at
39; Note, supra note 67, at 1677.
72. An inference may be drawn from the following that maximum punishments may not
be applied. An offender in Henrico County, Virginia, was found guilty of four counts of
involuntary manslaughter. The offender had been DWI, and a subsequent automobile crash
resulted in the deaths of four persons. The maximum penalty of twenty years (accident
occurred prior to implementation of new laws) was imposed, but one-half of the sentence
was suspended. This was "the harshest sentence in recent memory for a Henrico drunken-
driving case." Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 21, 1982, at 1, col 1.
73. See supra note 40.
74. See generally Gaynes, supra note 20; NHTSA HI, supra note 67. The attitude of pros-
ecutors toward DWI is indicated by a recent charge of second-degree murder, rather than
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fore, a sustained public outcry may generate stiffer penalties for actions
that result from drinking and driving.
B. Increased Maximum Punishment and Mandatory Jail Sentences
1. Increased Maximum Punishment
The new provisions in Virginia's laws authorizing penalties for convic-
tion of DWI include both an increase in the maximum allowable punish-
ment and mandatory jail sentences for second and third convictions. 5
The former remains within the discretion of the judge or jury; the latter
is seemingly removed from this discretion.
Studies from other jurisdictions indicate that most courts regard legis-
lated penalities for DWI as too harsh."6 This same attitude is found in
juries, even though the reluctance to convict runs counter to stated public
desires to toughen penalties. 7 The full range of statutory penalties is sel-
dom applied, thus making many penalties and their degree of harshness
irrelevant.
78
Other findings indicate that of those persons actually prosecuted for
DWI approximately one-half are found guilty. Furthermore, fines im-
posed are at the lower end of the range permitted; and jail sentences av-
eraged only one and one-half weeks per conviction."9 A nationwide mail
survey indicated that the usual punishment for DWI is a fine, and that
jail sentences are infrequent.8 0
These findings tend to indicate that even when the initial legislation
controlling DWI is toughened, reluctance on the part of the judge and
jury to impose severe penalties may diminish the harshness.8 ' Unless the
attitudes of the judiciary and the public toward DWI change, harsher
laws will have little effect on penalties administered for DWI.
s'
the usual charge of involuntary manslaughter, being lodged against a driver who was DWI
and whose actions resulted in the death of three others. The prosecutors said that "they
were influenced by the growing outcry about the death toll caused by drunk drivers" when
they chose to institute the harsher charge against the driver. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Sept. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6. The prosecutors prevailed in these charges against the driver,
even though the harsher charge required proof that the driver's actions reflected malice in
the "deliberate use of a deadly weapon." Id. at 4, col. 1.
75. See supra notes 42, 50.
76. NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 20.
77. Note, supra note 67, at 1677 n.140.
78. NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 4.
79. ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFWrY, supra note 1, at 39.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
82. Gaynes, supra note 20, at 28; Little, Administration of Justice in Drunk Driving
Cases, 58 A.B.A. J. 950, 953 (1972). See NHTSA H, supra note 67, at 28.
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2. Mandatory Jail Sentences
Mandatory jail sentences for DWI are certainly more strict than previ-
ous penalties; however, such harsh punishments, generally, are not uni-
formly enforced. In other localities where mandatory jail sentences have
been instituted, DWI is increasingly plea bargained to a lesser charge.
8 3
The threat of mandatory sentences encourages requests for trials, thus
clogging court calendars, and bringing increased reliance on plea bargain-
ing to clear the calendars.'"
The problem of overcrowded jails is exacerbated by mandatory
sentences. Jail space in some states, including Virginia, is already inade-
quate.85 And one must not overlook the fact that the daily costs of main-
taining convicted drunk drivers in jail is burdensome to the taxpaying
public.
When judicial discretion is removed and the penalties are severe, judges
tend to become innovators. Such innovations include withholding convic-
tion and requiring stricter supporting evidence for conviction as well as
an increasing use of plea bargaining.8 6 Should the new DWI laws be con-
sidered too severe by the Virginia judiciary, the possibility exists for judi-
cial innovation to avoid these penalties. Certainly stricter penalties which
are awarded by the judiciary will fail to meet the expectations of the pro-
moters of such legislation.
C. Recordation of Convictions and the Restricted License
1. Interrelationship of the Sections
There are two aspects of the new DWI laws that may lead to a more
strict application than under the old laws. First, section 18.2-271.1(a) of
the Virginia Code 7 requires that a person must be convicted of violating
the DWI section before the person may enter a VASAP program.8 Sec-
ond, the person may be issued a restricted license to drive only on admis-
sion to such a program.89 The interrelationship of these statutory sections
may encourage the judiciary to enforce the DWI section because DWI is a
prerequisite to issuance of a restricted license.
83. NHTSA 11, supra note 67, at 25.
84. Id. See Gaynes, supra note 20, at 29. Julian Hickman stated the expectation in Vir-
ginia was crowded court dockets because persons would be seeking either to avoid a class
one misdemeanor conviction since it affects employee security clearances, or to avoid the
mandatory jail sentence. This had not occurred by the date of the interview, Aug. 3, 1982.
Interview with Julian Hickman, supra note 30.
85. Gaynes, supra note 20, at 29; Note, Prison Overcrowding as Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment in Light of Rhodes v. Chapman, 16 U. RICH. L. Rzy. 621, 645 (1982).
86. NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 4.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(a) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
88. Id. § 18.2-271.1(a). See supra note 56.
89. Id. § 18.2-271.1(bla). See supra note 60.
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2. Recordation of Convictions
To trigger the harsher sanctions for subsequent convictions of DWI it is
necessary that the prior offense be proven.90 The previous Virginia stat-
ute did not require entry of a conviction on the records prior to a referral
to VASAP.91 As a result, many offenders were able to complete the pro-
gram and enter a plea to a lesser offense, or be found not guilty. 2 The
usual result of this practice was that record systems were undermined
and the repeat offender was often treated as a first time offender rather
than as a recidivist."3
This former practice of the Virginia judiciary is not possible under the
new laws.9 4 Under the new section, a conviction must be recorded if a
judge wants to place an offender in a VASAP program. This in turn al-
lows the courts to recognize recidivism and to treat offenders accordingly.
Of course, if it so chooses, the judiciary still has the opportunities dis-
cussed earlier to circumvent the DWI conviction. 5
3. The Restricted License
The courts show extreme sensitivity to external sanctions that result
from a DWI conviction.' Examples of these external sanctions which the
90. Calfee v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 253, 208 S.E.2d 740 (1974).
91. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 18.2-271.1(a). See Letter from Gerald L. Baliles, Attorney
General of Virginia, to the Honorable James H. Harvell, Judge (June 23, 1982) (an Opinion
of the Attorney General discussing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-271 and -271.1 (RepL Vol. 1982))
[hereinafter cited as Op. Att'y Gen.].
92. VASAP FAcT SHEET, supra note 2, at 4-3.
93. NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 5, 7.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(b)- (Repl. Vol. 1982), reads:
Upon conviction of a violation of § 18.2-266 or any ordinance of a county, city or
town similar to the provisions thereof, the court shall impose sentence as authorized
by §§ 18.2-270 and 18.2-271. Upon a finding that a person so convicted is eligible for
participation in the program described herein, the court shall enter the conviction on
the warrant, and shall note that the person so convicted has been referred to such
program. The court may then proceed to issue an order in accordance with paragraph
(bla) of this section, if the court finds that the person so convicted is eligible for a
restricted license. If the court finds that a person is not eligible for such program or
subsequently that such person has violated, without good cause, any of the conditions
set forth by the court in entering the program, the court shall dispose of the case as if
no program had been entered, in which event the revocation provisions of §§ 18.2-271
and 46.1-421(a) shall be applicable to the conviction. The court shall, upon final dis-
position of the case, send a copy of its order to the Commissioner of the Division of
Motor Vehicles. If such order provides for the issuance of a restricted license, the
Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles, upon receipt thereof, shall issue a
restricted license. Appeals from any such disposition shall be allowed as provided by
law. The time within which an appeal may be taken shall be calculated from the date
of the final disposition of the case or any motion for a rehearing, whichever is later.
95. NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 4. See supra text accompanying note 86.
96. NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 29.
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judiciary cannot control are increased insurance rates, defense attorney
fees, fees for DWI school, and loss of job or income due to revocation of a
drivers license.97 Judges consider the loss of driving privileges to be an
extreme punishment. In cases "[w]here a person needed a license to work,
it was almost certain that he or she would not lose that license."
Studies indicate that the most effective weapon the court has in its ar-
senal to gain cooperation from a drinking driver is the threat to suspend
driving privileges.99 The courts also regard the power to withdraw driving
privileges as one of their most important weapons.100 The court is thus
placed in a quandry, as conviction of DWI sets in action the above exter-
nal sanctions, which are beyond the control of the court. Therefore, to
retain control of the sanctions imposed on the offender, the court needs
to take action against the privilege to drive through the less burdensome
sanction of the restricted license.
As part of the new DWI laws in Virginia, section 18.2-271.1(bla)0 1 of
the Virginia Code allows the judge to issue a restricted license to one con-
victed of DWI. The person must be a first or second time offender, con-
victed of DWI, and must be entered in a VASAP program.102
The restricted license is an alternative to revocation, a sanction consid-
ered so severe that it will not be enforced by the judiciary.103 The re-
stricted license thus serves as a satisfactory compromise. The judiciary
retains the discretion necessary to administer justice to individual offend-
ers1 04 if the offender meets the conditions of being a first or second time
offender convicted of DWI and is entered in a VASAP program. The re-
sult may be more uniform action against the driving privilege of drinking
drivers.10 5 The judiciary can convict for DWI without completely revoking
the privilege to drive. This compromise, coupled with the conditions pre-
cedent to issuance of a restricted license, may result in more convictions
for DWI.
Some interest has already been displayed by the Virginia judiciary con-
97. Id.
98. NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 5.
99. Id. at 6. See NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 29. The operation of automobiles on state
highways is not a natural right, i.e. a constitutional right. It is a conditional privilege that
may be revoked under the state's police power. Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 4
S.E.2d 762 (1939).
100. NHTSA 1978, supra note 67, at 6.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(bla) (RepL. Vol. 1982). See supra note 60.
102. Id. § 18.2-271.1(a), (bla). See supra notes 56, 60.
103. See Op. Att'y Gen. (June 23, 1982), supra note 91; Little, supra note 82, at 953;
NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 29.
104. See Giorno, Sentencing in Criminal Cases: How Great the Need for Reform?, 13 U.
RICH. L. Rzv. 899, 912 (1979). See generally Young, Some Reflections on Criminal Sentenc-
ing, 12 U. TOL. L. Rav. 475 (1981).
105. See NHTSA II, supra note 67, at 29.
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cerning the power of a court to issue a restricted license.106 It is clear that
a restricted license may be issued for a first offense of DWI; however, it is
not clear, on the face of the statute, whether a restricted license may be
issued for a second offense. For a second offense, the court may suspend
two of the three years, or one of the two years, of the mandated time for
license revocation. 107 There are no restrictions placed on a second of-
fender that preclude the meeting of conditions precedent 0 8 necessary for
the issuance of a restricted license.
An Opinion of the Attorney General'0 9 addresses this question. It reads,
in part:
[T]he Court may, in its discretion for good cause shown, provide that such
person be issued a restricted permit to operate a motor vehicle for any or all
of the purposes enumerated therein. There is nothing in this new paragraph
• . . which precludes a court from issuing a restricted license for the year
the Court is not authorized to suspend pursuant to § 18.2-271.110
Due to the lack of legislative history on the new DWI laws,",, it is not
possible to state whether such an outcome was intended by the General
Assembly. However, it now appears that both first and second offenders
convicted of DWI may be issued a restricted license, at the discretion of
the court.
D. Out-of-State Convictions
The changes in section 18.2-271(bl)"' of the Virginia Code governing
out-of-state DWI convictions center mainly on recordation of the convic-
tions. Under the previous statute, a person convicted out-of-state could
petition the court for VASAP treatment, receive such treatment, and
then have the out-of-state convictions expunged from Virginia Division of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) records."l 3 As expungement of the record is not
possible under the new legislation, 4 the legal system has cognizance of
the person as a previous DWI offender. For any subsequent offenses, the
person is subject to harsher sanctions allowable for second or third con-
victions. In this sense, the law is harsher.
106. A question concerning the issuance of a restricted license was raised by the Honora-
ble James H. Harvell. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 91.
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1982). See supra note 50.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (bla) (Repl. Vol. 1982). See supra notes 60, 104-05 and
accompanying text.
109. The weight of an Attorney General's Opinion is not binding on a court, but it is of
the most persuasive character and entitled to due consideration. Barber v. City of Danville,
149 Va. 418, 141 S.E. 126 (1928).
110. Op. Att'y Gen. (June 23, 1982), supra note 91, at 4.
111. See supra note 30.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(bl) (Repl. Vol. 1982). See supra note 63.
113. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 301, § 46.1-417.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-417 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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Yet, the general thrust of the changes seemingly is, however, to afford
parity of treatment to Virginia citizens convicted under out-of-state laws
which are harsher than Virginia's. As an example, one provision allows a
judge to restore the privilege to drive when it has been taken away by an
out-of-state court.115 Therefore, the only change concerning an out-of-
state conviction that seems more strict is the loss of ability to expunge
the DMV record following completion of a VASAP program.116
V. CONCLUSION
The 1982 legislation enacted by the Virginia General Assembly creates
the potential for harsher punishment of persons convicted of DWI. The
new provisions include an increase in the maximum allowable punish-
ments, and in the amount of time for which a license can be suspended,
and provide mandatory jail sentences for subsequent convictions. Studies
from other states indicate, however, that the legal system will not enforce
sanctions it considers too severe. The new laws will, of course, be harsher
only if they are enforced by the legal system.
Other provisions in the 1982 legislation provide a conduit for harsher
treatment of DWI offenders. These provisions require a conviction prior
to referral to a VASAP program and allow the issuance of a restricted
license upon entry in the program. The recordation of convictions allows
the legal system to identify recidivists and the restricted license allows a
judge to convict for DWI, while allowing the offender to use the restricted
license for employment purposes. These provisions should overcome the
judiciary's previous reluctance to convict of DWI and to impose the driv-
ers license suspension sanction.
The problem of DWI in Virginia is considered a pervasive problem that
requires further action. Such action is anticipated based on the creation
of a Governor's Task Force to Combat Drunk Driving. The membership
of the task force is comprised of legislators, law enforcement officials,
medical personnel, and citizens representing groups that lobbied for the
new DWI laws. If the high interest in DWI legislation is maintained, the
possibility exists for new, even stricter, DWI laws for Virginia.
Eddie W. Wilson
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(bl) (Repl. Vol. 1982). See supra note 63.
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-417 (Cum. Supp. 1982). See supra note 65.
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